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Abstract 
In discussions on the spread and prospects of democracy in the global south, 
Africa and Middle East are often depicted as less democratic, indeed 
undemocratic, regions. Both are seen as ridden with dictators, monarchies 
and dynastic rulers. Of course, such generalisations have their own flaws, but 
there is some truth regarding democratic deficits in the two regions. This 
piece explores the challenges of democracy in Africa and the Middle East. It 
asks the following questions: what are the factors militating against 
democracy? Is democracy a necessary precondition for development in the 
two regions? How are countries coming to terms with the challenges of 
democracy and nation-building?  
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Introduction  
 
For some time, “democracy” has been in vogue in the global South. This is to be 
understood within the context of the so-called “democracy revolution” or “third wave” 
of democratisation (Huntington, 1991, Shin 1994). Following the collapse of the defunct 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the triumphant emergence of US and its allies as 
unipolar global powers, there has been tremendous pressure on countries of the global 
South. Hitherto littered with military and one-party dictatorships and personal rulers, 
these countries were forced to abandon their “old ways” and embrace liberal democracy 
– the kind of democracy practiced in the West but now foisted on weaker states as a 
precondition for aid and productive cooperation. Foreign pressure coincided with, or 
reinforced, domestic clamours to push regimes to concede to democratic reforms 
(Schmitz, 2004: 403).  
 
While most African countries have fallen to the tide of “democratic revolution” one after 
the other, their Middle Eastern counterparts have largely resisted such tides and/or 
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customised their political processes to meet developmental needs, even if doing so will 
compromise democracy. What are the challenges of democracy in the two regions? To 
what extent is democracy-building different and/or similar in the two settings? We shall 
return to these questions later. 
   
In spite of negative impressions about African and Middle Eastern countries as the 
homeland of dictators and despots, there are glimmers of hope and optimism in both 
regions. The past two decades have no doubt seen steady expansion of the frontiers of 
liberal democracy in the two regions, but certainly in Africa. In Africa, for instance, by 
1990s profound democratic reforms had swept across the entire continent, including 
South Africa where the white-settler apartheid system collapsed in favour of multi-party 
democracy. From Algeria to DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) and from Benin to 
Kenya, democratic reforms led to the collapse of decades of single-party dictatorships 
and military rule. Africa‟s democratic wave of the 1990s and 2000s has been termed 
“second independence” reminiscent of anti-colonial struggles of the 1950 and 60s which 
led to the end of European colonial projects in Africa (Eke, 1995: 25). In the Middle 
East, however, democratic reform was not as widespread as developmental strides. 
Nevertheless, the region witnessed internal democratic reforms leading to the 
construction of local democratic structures undergirded by cultural dynamics of the 
region – for instance, the tribal systems in most states meant that democracy appears to 
favour tribal lords and their loyalists. That is, liberal democracy has not been able to 
dislodge aristocratic and tribal anatomy of the region. Rather, the region appears to 
customise liberal democracy. The efficacy and genuineness of liberal democracy to fit 
indigenous needs is still unfolding and subject of debate. 
 
This paper explores the challenges of democracy in Africa and the Middle East by 
charting the contours of debate/commentaries, and then presenting some interesting 
articles submitted to the present volume of Information, Society and Justice, each  dealing 
with specific issues such as elite politics, political corruption, elections, and oil resource in 
relations to democracy-building in Africa and Middle East.  
 
The challenges of liberal democracy in Africa and Middle 
East 
 
Post-colonial states of Africa and Middle East2 share some commonalities and 
differences. They share more or less common features such as colonial experiences, 
entrenchment of dictatorship, neo-patrimonial cultures, fragile economies3 and foreign 
influence. Both regions are often classified as conflict-prone societies characterised by 
interstate skirmishes, civil wars and contests over power and resources. However, there 
are nuanced differences: for instance, Africa countries are more heterogeneous, 
underdeveloped and at the mercy of western imperialism. On the contrary, Middle East 
                                                          
2 It is imperative to make some clarifications on Africa and Middle East. In this paper Africa 
refers to as sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa while the Middle East includes Arabian and 
Gulf countries, including Iran and Turkey. 
 
3 This factor is relative. First, African countries are seen as more fragile than their Middle Eastern 
counterparts. Second, the period of economic fragility varies: for instance, in Africa 1970s and 
1980s was a period of tumultuous economic and structural crises, while 1990s and 2000s have 
been characterised by some recoveries and giant leaps as experienced in Ghana, South Africa and 
Angola.  
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countries are relatively more developed, less dependent on Western donations, and have 
a relatively more patriotic political class that invests in tangible economic development, 
as demonstrated by the so-called “economic miracles” of Gulf countries such as United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. This is not to absolve Middle Eastern elites 
from poor governance or corrupt tendencies; rather, by virtue of their developmental 
credentials they have earned the cliché of “benevolent elites” who, while being self-
aggrandising, spends a percentage of the commonwealth on national development. The 
same cannot be said of Africa elites some of who have been associated with high-level 
corruption and financial impropriety – for instance, in Nigeria, Gabon, and Senegal the 
so-called democratic elites are facing allegations of corruptions, and there are concerns 
about the embedded nature of corruption is state and society.4 
 
In terms of political culture, most African countries, being products of colonialism, have 
stronger ties with their former colonial masters (Britain, France, Spain, Italy) and are 
coming to terms with post-colonial challenges ranging from contested boundaries, 
ethnicity, corruption, nepotism to client-patron relations. The so-called “colonial 
hangover” is deeply embedded. France, for instance, has always maintained strong ties 
with its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, aimed at sustaining its neo-colonial grip in 
these countries5 On the other hand, Middle East countries developed somewhat different 
political cultures. Many shed the so-called colonial ties: they refused to sign defence pacts 
with those powers, while some even abandoned the colonial Lingua Franca in favour of 
local official languages. However, the structures in those states were defined by strong 
ties to religion (especially Islam in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Syria), 
and tribal and clan systems with hierarchical social stratification. Both religion and 
tribalism influenced Middle Eastern political cultures by giving greater clouts to cultural 
establishment (e.g. in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iraq): theocratic elites and tribal lords double as 
community leaders and state officials. In monarchical states such as United Arab 
Emirate, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, there have emerged family rulers who established 
elaborate political state systems capable of asserting hegemony over a bevy of nomadic 
and sedentary tribes. Middle Eastern countries also developed fairly bourgeoning 
economic systems and attracted Foreign Direct Investments from Western countries. 
The reality of development seem to have dwarfed the imperatives of democracy: by 
1990s while Western donors were applying the “stick” in democratising Africa, they 
applied mild “carrot” measures on Middle East countries6. They overlooked the excesses 
of political regimes simply because these regimes were doing well developmentally.   
 
 
As stated earlier, western donors were at the forefront of advocating liberal democracy to 
                                                          
4 BBC (2004) “How deep is corruption in Africa” available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3819027.stm, accessed 29th May 2010. 
 
5 France‟s politics in Africa is highly dramatic: it was known to support friendly dictatorial 
regimes and master-mind or even carry out military coups to install puppet governments. By mid-
1990s France was in alliance with its Western counterparts in influencing its former colonies to 
democratise. But it maintained a double standard so that friendly regimes were immune from 
pressures for democratisation. 
 
6 This is because African countries emerged from the Cold War with weak economies and fragile 
political systems. They rushed to Western donors for support. In return for aid, these countries 
were asked to accept “political conditionalities” which involved taking measures to 
institutionalise economic liberalisation and adoption of multiparty democratic structures. 
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less developed countries, including those of Africa and Middle East. This new political 
model is defined as 
 
Political change moving in a democratic direction from less accountable to 
more accountable government, from less competitive (or non-existent) 
elections to fuller and fairer competitive elections, from severely restricted to 
better protected civil and political rights, from weak (or non-existent) 
autonomous associations to more autonomous and more numerous 
associations in civil society (Potter, 2004: 368) 
 
In practice, a liberal democracy is “a type of regime in which binding rules and policy 
decisions are made not by entire community but by representatives accountable to the 
community. This accountability is secured primarily through free, fair and competitive 
elections in which virtually all adult men and women have the right to vote and stand for 
elective office” (ibid: 366-7). Furthermore, citizens within a liberal democracy have the 
inalienable right to “express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political 
matters broadly defined, including criticisms of officials, the government, the regime, the 
socio-economic order, the prevailing ideology and to form relatively independent 
associations or organisations including independent political parties and interest groups 
(Dahl, 1989 in Potter, ibid, 367). The foregoing platitudes about liberal democracy are 
problematic in Africa and Middle East where the political culture and the nature of social 
and economic process are quite different compared to the Western democracies, from 
where the concepts of liberal democracy originated.  
 
There are profound problems with applying liberal democracy in toto in less developed 
countries. The prevailing notion, especially in 1990s and 2000s, is that “Western concept 
of democracy is more or less accepted throughout the world” or that “western programs 
to support democratization are welcomed by all save those who would be dislodged by 
the process” (Barkan, 1994: 3). But Less Developed Countries possess weak structures 
that need fixing and some of their norms are at odd with those of liberal culture. Ake 
(1993: 241), writing on Africa, notes that “in order for African democracy to be relevant 
and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy. For one 
thing, it will have to de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic 
rights, because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the 
prevailing economic conditions within”.  Joseph (1997: 367-8) offers the following 
critique of what he calls the glorification of liberal democracy as virtual democracy as applied to 
African countries: 
 
1. Hollow symbolism: While liberal democracy is symbolically based on citizen rule, 
“the making of key decisions, especially in the area of economic reform policies, 
is insulated from popular involvement”.  
 
2. Hegemonic class rule: Liberal democracy does not necessary dislodge the dominant 
ruling class; in fact, it empowers the wealthy: “hegemonic economic forces in 
society, as well as those in control of the state apparatus, must be secure in the 
protection of their interests and able to minimize threats to them by formerly 
excluded or dominant groups for a smooth transition from authoritarian rule to 
occur”.  
 
 
Table 1: Global Patterns of Democratisation 
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 1975 1995 
 Authorit-
arian 
Partial 
democracy 
Liberal 
democracy 
 
Authorit-
arian 
Partial 
democracy 
Liberal 
democracy 
Western 
Europe, 
North 
America & 
Australia 
 
2 0 22 0 0 24 
Latin America  15 2 
 
 
5 
 
2 5 15 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
43 2 3 12 16 20 
Eastern 
Europe and 
USSR/former 
USSR 
 
9 0 0 5 14 8 
Asia 
 
18 4 3 
 
11 4 10 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
 
14 3 2 13 3 2 
Totals 
 
101 11 35 43 42 79 
1975 (N=147) 68.7% 7.5% 23.8%    
1995 (N=164)    26.2% 25.6% 48.2% 
 
Source: Potter, 2004: 369 
 
3. Entrenchment of capitalism: liberal democracy does not allow for the adoption of 
alternative political and economic models: “central to this variant of democracy is 
the creation of opportunities for the further development of a capitalist or market 
economy. While capitalism can exist without democracy, there are no 
contemporary democracies that are not capitalist or that do not create the 
institutional framework for the expansion of capitalism”.  
 
4. External pressure and domination: the current efflorescence of liberal democracy is 
made possible by western pressures in the post-Cold War period. “External 
forces are critical to the establishment of democracy in areas formerly under 
authoritarian rule. But such pressures are not pitched on any rational motif other 
than the entrenchment of western interest”.  
 
5. Entrenchment of status quo: “Most decisive in democratic transitions are the choices 
made by those enjoying governmental and social power when faced with 
challenges to their dominance. Such individuals and groups often realize that 
democratization can be manipulated to legitimize their continuation in power”.  
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6. Policy and institutional encumbrance: “While the core institutions and practices of 
contemporary democracy rest on the premise of a free play of ideas and interests, 
certain substantive policy outcomes are ruled out, and others are assured. 
Participation may be broad, but policy choices are narrow”.  
 
Paradoxically, due to Western “double standards” (see e.g. footnote #5), majority of 
African countries have undergone some form of donor-foisted liberal democratisation, 
while their Middle Eastern counterparts are largely exempt from external pressure to 
democratise (see Table 1). The differential treatment by donors of African and Middle 
Eastern countries owes it logic partly to the failure of the former to develop truly 
independent and viable political and economic systems capable of defying foreign 
influence  and, in contrast, the capacity of the later to make some developmental 
advancement capable of defying foreign pressures. Middle Eastern countries have largely 
taken pride on their development profile to resist any external impetus to democratise. 
Based on the modest economic achievements of Middle East states, some have even 
questioned whether liberal democracy is a necessary precondition for development?    
 
Table 1 shows the movement toward democracy in the two regions. The Table gives a 
clue during the 1990s, perhaps the most crucial moment of democratisation in the two 
regions. It shows that in the period between 1975 and 1995, the number of authoritarian 
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa dropped dramatically from 43 to 12, while liberal 
democratic systems rose from just 3 to 20! In the same period, authoritarian regimes in 
Middle East countries remained almost static; it hinged between 14 and 13, while the 
adoption of liberal democracy remained the same (n=2). Why have many Africa 
countries adopted liberal democracy while their Middle Eastern counterparts have not 
made much progress? The reasons can be found partly in the internal political culture of 
the two regions, and partly in the interests and role of western donors (for more details 
see Chabal, 1998). 
 
Africa: elite politics, electoral irregularity and corruption  
  
Democratization was not supposed to happen in Africa. It had too little of 
what seemed necessary for constitutional democratic polities. African 
countries were too poor, too culturally fragmented, and insufficiently 
capitalist; they ... lacked the requisite civic culture. Middle classes were 
usually weak and more bureaucratic than entrepreneurial, and they were 
often co-opted into authoritarian political structures. Working classes, except 
in a few cases such as Zambia and South Africa, were embryonic (Joseph, 
1997: 363) 
 
Joseph indeed paints a gloomy picture of democracy in Africa. Extreme as it sounds, 
there is some truth in this assertion. The political and economic cultures of many African 
countries are still underdeveloped and unstable. They lack the necessary conditions of 
instituting liberal democracy such as a strong and independent middle class, a 
competitive party system; constitutionalism and rule of law; a neutral bureaucracy and 
strong market economies.7 In such a setting, it is difficult to build liberal democracy. In 
                                                          
7 We should, however, not loose sight of the fact that a few African countries have achieved 
significant mileage in liberal democratic consolidation, both in qualitative and quantitative terms: 
Ghana, South Africa and Botswana are arguably some of the most democratic states on the 
Continent.  But they are out-shadowed by those engulfed in treacherous transition, and/or 
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the early 1990s when African countries are transiting en masse towards the so-called liberal 
democracy, Ake (1993: 239) wrote “it is difficult to discern what kind of democracy is 
emerging in Africa and what unique features will give it depth and sustainability in 
African conditions”. Chabal reinforces Ake‟s concern on why Africa countries were 
facing difficulties in building liberal democracy: 
 
In the first place, there is the persistent claim that multi-party elections are 
controlled and distorted, when not actually rigged, by incumbent regimes. 
Secondly, there is the nagging doubt that democratically elected regimes have 
every intention of subverting the momentum for political liberalization by 
ruling much as the previous one-party regimes did. Thirdly, there are very 
obvious limits to the actual democratic nature of functioning multi-party 
systems, chief of which seems to be that such systems have no place for 
political opposition. Finally, and most ominously, there is the unavoidable 
fact that where multi-party elections have failed to bring about genuine 
improvements, Africans have begun to lose faith in “democracy” (Chabal, 
1998: 290) 
 
Contributions to the present Volume of Information, Society and Justice reinforce Chabal‟s 
concerns, and raise further issues regarding the problems of building liberal democracy in 
Africa. Three key themes are explored: hegemony and subordination in elite politics (Tar 
and Shettima), political corruption (Mustapha) and elections (Osiki) – all in the context 
of Nigeria.8   
 
Tar and Shettima (2010) recall empirical evidence from the Nigerian 2007 and 2011 
general elections to examine the behaviour and performance of Africa‟s political class in 
constructing legitimation, subordination and hegemony. They note that the elections 
remain relevant because it provides fresh empirical evidence on the nature elite contest 
for power which, though characterised by injustices and imperfections, nonetheless 
remained relatively unchallenged either by local or international forces. They thus note: 
“As African countries continue in their march towards neo-liberal democracy, elite power 
politics has assumed new but macabre heights. The continent‟s governing class is 
demonstrating dramatic behaviour in achieving and sustaining power by all means 
possible.” They further argue that rival elements of the governing class are engaged in a 
vicious circle of subordinating one another, albeit with no threat to their hegemony but 
with huge implication for the prospects of a stable liberal democratic culture. They make 
reference to Michael Foucault‟s concepts of „new economy of power relations‟ and 
„legitimation‟ as well as Antonio Gramsci‟s terminology of „subordination and hegemony‟ 
to demonstrate that, by both design and default, dominant form and structures of power 
are reproduced and sustained by the governing class. The paper shows that dominant 
elites (incumbents and their allies) use state structures and an emerging single-party 
machinery to get an upper hand over opposition elites. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
relapse of veiled dictatorships (multiparty democratic state only in name!). 
 
8 To use analyses on Nigeria as evidence to generalize Africa appears to be a skewed approach. 
However, Nigeria represents a clear example of a country undergoing some difficulties in 
building liberal democracy on the continent. Since our aim in this volume is with the challenges 
of democracy on the continent, Nigeria may well stand as a good candidate for generalization.  
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Table 2: Challenges of democracy & democratisation in Africa 
 
Challenge Remarks 
Lack of credible 
opposition  
Absence of a strong opposition parties that can challenge 
the policies and programmes of the ruling party; absence of 
alternative policy programme choices required by electorate; 
zero-sum struggle for power. 
 
Weak civil society  Lack of strong, dense and vibrant civic groups who will act 
as a counterbalance to state hegemony; such groups are 
expected to resist cooptation by state but, instead, provide a 
permanent independent check on state power; the weakness 
of civil society is often as a result of a lack of strong middle 
class with its own class interest and stake in society.  
 
Weak economies Productive economy needed to allow state to supply goods 
and service to electorate; scarce resources could persuade, 
even force, electorates to abandon democratic processes. At 
worse, citizens can be “bought” to vote for wrong choices. 
 
No separation between 
state and ruling party  
Ruling party dominate and manipulate the political process; 
constitutions are regularly amended to retain power; state 
resources are ostensibly used to advance the interest of the 
ruling party; state security forces are used to coerce citizens 
and opposition groups 
 
Ethnicity, religion & 
nepotism 
Politics and governance are mitigated by divisive sectarian 
tendencies; democratic process (voting etc) is held hostage 
by the sectarian sentiments and loyalties of political actors 
and voters; state policies are influenced by sectarian 
fragmentation and sentiments. 
 
Potentials of military 
intervention  
There is high chance of military intervention as a result of 
any confusion created by political deadlock between parties. 
 
Weak democratic 
political culture  
Ruling elites do not respect democratic values such as rule 
of law and human rights; opposition parties and pressure 
groups are forced or induced into abandoning their role 
checking the excesses of state officials; weak democratic 
structures and values such as participation, civil liberties, 
voting etc. 
 
Lack of regime change 
(incumbency 
continuum) 
A sustained tradition of limited political change; regime 
continuity; oppression of dissent. 
 
Source: adapted from Thomson (2004: 245) 
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Nigeria‟s zero-sum nature of power politics and electoral democracy appear to have huge 
implications for the sustenance of liberal democracy. The key questions are: if democracy 
is about participation, rule of law and legitimate negotiation for power, how could it be 
built in a country where elites have appropriated ethnicity, wealth and religion to outwit 
one another and remain in power? How could democracy thrive in a state where stakes 
on state power are so high, while official corruption and abuse of state resources are 
elevated to near state policy? How could democracy thrive in a system where elections 
are abused through commercialisation of votes, ballot-box stuffing, and manipulation of 
election results? 
 
Osiki (2010) explores the vexed problem of electoral irregularities in Nigeria and its 
hindrance to democratic consolidation. Osiki examines the historical and political 
contexts of election regularities, and the impact of the illegal use of money, weapons and 
thugs as aspects of electoral irregularities in the conduct of elections in Nigeria between 
1999 and 2007.  Osiki argues that Nigeria demonstrates an ugly specimen: “although, 
Nigeria‟s case of electoral irregularities may not be unique, their magnitude makes it a 
good subject of historical investigations.”  Osiki‟s conclusion is quite instructive: 
 
Bribery, use of thugs and physical weapons continued to be part of the 
political development of Nigeria and the country‟s electoral politics between 
1999 and 2007. Elements of money politics, use of thugs and dangerous 
weapons were effectively used by the political class to alienate the electorate 
and have a firm grip on the machinery of government. The trend helped to 
sustain the phenomenon of “godfatherism”, which assumed a potent force 
in Nigeria during the period. The fact that the Nigerian electoral system 
thrived on patronages made the illegal use of money, weapons and goons the 
surest option available to the political elite.  
 
Mustapha (2010) explores the conceptual and empirical dimensions of corruption in 
Nigeria. His article identifies new ramifications of corruption and prebendalism in 
Nigerian political culture. This article questions state-centric analyses of Nigerian politics 
and democracy by recalling the formal and informal dimensions of corruption. The formal 
dimension – or official corruption – is seen to be existing side by side with informal one 
such as financial fraud tagged „419‟, „oil bunkering‟ etc operating at the micro and indeed 
unofficial level of the state. He argues that both kinds of corruption impact negatively 
on democracy and state-society relations. Mustapha‟s conclusion is striking: 
 
The argument is that there is an intrinsic link between mis-use of official 
resources for personal aggrandizement with the current pervasive nature of 
spoil system. Failure of governance and the „cunning to milk‟ the state 
approach by the few have deepened the phenomenon of poverty. Compelled 
by the negative impact of “graft politics” that excluded the majority of the 
populace, most Nigerians resorted into series of societal illegalities that 
becomes the norms of the society. The lingering wave of financial fraud code 
named as “419”, „oil bunkering‟ “kidnappings” has strains the ethical 
disposition of the state and come to tenaciously spoiled the entire socio-
political and economic fabric of the state [with implications for democracy] –
emphasis added 
  
The foregoing analysis underscore the multiple problem of democracy in Africa, based 
on data from Nigeria. The next section returns to the Middle East. 
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 Middle East: resource curse, state ideology and fragile 
democratisation 
 
People in the Middle East want political freedom, and their governments 
acknowledge the need for reform. Yet the region appears to repel 
democracy. Arab regimes only concede women‟s rights and elections to 
appease their critics at home and abroad (Ottaway and Carothers, 2004: 22).  
 
Since 1980s, democracy has made steady inroad to the Middle East even though reversals 
were apparent by 1990s: “During the 1980s, several Arab countries, including Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Jordan, initiated political reforms to permit multiparty competition. These 
reforms lost momentum or were undone in the 1990s, however, as Arab leaders proved 
unwilling to risk their own power through genuine processes of democratisation. Tunisia, 
for example, moved back to rigid authoritarian rule” (Ottaway and Carothers, 2004: 22-
23). Nevertheless, there has been steady rise of domestic and external pressure for 
democratisation, especially in the aftermaths of September 11 2001, Al-Qaeda attack on 
the US. 9/11 reinforced prevailing stereotype of Middle East as an Islamist 
fundamentalist stronghold posing danger to the rest of the “free world”. Western 
countries therefore called for political reforms with a view to building transparent 
democratic cultures capable of building peace and dealing with terrorist threats. In some 
countries such as Iraq, Western countries even sought direct military intervention to 
depose despotic regime and institutionalise democracy.9 Reinforcing foreign pressure, 
Middle Eastern regimes have always faced tremendous pressure from domestic 
democratic movements calling for constitutional reforms and multiparty democracy that 
will put an end to family and tribal rule that has characterised the region. But on the main 
they have almost always resisted such pressures. 
 
Thus, the region has not made much progress in liberal democratic reforms. There are 
scathing scepticism and grim diagnoses. Example: “Although the Arab world is not 
impervious to political change, it has yet to truly begin the process of 
democratization...Arab governments curb political participation, manipulate elections, 
and limit freedom of expression because they do not want their power challenged” 
(Ottaway and Carothers, 2004: 23). But it is worthy of note the problems of the Middle 
East are common not only in Middle East but other parts of the World – such as the 
former Soviet Republics. So, what puts Middle East and similar settings in a different 
pedestal when it comes to the construction and consolidation of liberal democracy? 
 
In this Volume, four contributions (Ahmed, Bapir, Abdulla and Sagnic) assess the 
problems of democracy in the Middle East. Ahmed (2010) examine why oil wealth has 
not facilitated democracy in the region. Ahmed questions the conventional wisdom that 
oil wealth offers a vehicle for democracy and development. He argues that that in the 
context of the Middle East, oil wealth appears to hamper transition to democracy, much 
less democratic consolidation. This is because oil revenues are used by the states both to 
quell internal clamours for democratisation and resist external pressures. Ahmed notes 
that Western countries‟ demands for hydrocarbon energy from the Middle East have 
placed them in a difficult position of transacting strategic commodity from a volatile 
region perceived to be undemocratic and undemocratising. This dilemma has 
                                                          
9 There are arguments on western military intervention in Iraq and other countries, as well as the 
implication for democracy (see Von Hippel, 2000). 
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implications for both Western democratising credentials, and the prospects of democracy 
in the region. Ahmed notes that “substantial oil or natural resource revenues could 
constitute a real problem and a hindrance to democratization. They provide the 
governments with more than enough cash to be self-supporting and capable of lowering 
or abolishing taxes, thus they escape from their accountability towards their citizens and 
use the large revenues to suppress and co-opt opposition.” He further argues that the 
democratic deficits in oil-rich Middle East countries stand contrary to the trend 
elsewhere: “there are other oil-rich states elsewhere such as Norway and Indonesia that 
have relatively large amounts of oil and also successful at maintaining their democracies 
and a healthy economic development that is immune from the resource-curse.” 
 
In their respective articles, Abdullah (2010) and Bapir (2010) examine the challenges of 
democracy in Iraq.  Both papers excavate the difficult tasks of re-building in a country 
scarred by decades of dictatorship, wars and international sanctions. Abdullah (2010) 
argues that the 2003 US-led invasion of the country led to a swift demise of Saddam 
Hussein and his Baathist state apparatus. But the easy removal of Saddam was followed 
by a rather difficult challenge of rebuilding a war-ravaged country and institutionalising 
Western-type liberal democracy. Abdullah argues that  
 
lack of deep-understanding of the Iraq‟s culture had led to the former US 
administration to equate the demise of Saddam with the demise of 
totalitarianism. The presence of Saddam was a great obstacle of democracy, 
but his removal changed little. Saddam and his former like-minded people 
created a culture capable of producing as many dictators as it wants.” He 
further notes that “Iraq‟s political culture is highly undemocratic; and thus 
the future of democracy in the country is bleak [as manifested by] important 
incompatible elements of Iraq‟s culture with democracy. (Emphasis added).  
 
Abdullah‟s findings illuminates the powerful argument of Galbraith (2007) that in the 
course of US and allied invasion of Iraq, so many things went wrong: manufactured 
intelligence used to justify the war; poor execution of the war especially violations of 
military rules of engagement; haphazard management of situation following the capture 
of Saddam; careless dismantling of state apparatus and assets; poorly-managed 
negotiations amongst Iraqi elites leading to highly contested democratic pacts and 
processes etc (for a review of Galbraith, see Nuradeen [2010] in this Volume).  
 
Bapir (2010), also writing on Iraq, considers the challenges of building democracy in a 
divided, conflict-riven society. He notes that “the major constraint to Iraq‟s state-building 
project is the misfit between identity and sovereignty of the state in a multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious country where the construction of a new national identity (i.e. Iraqi) is 
sought at the expense of eradicating other existing identities (i.e. Kurd, Assyrian).” He 
further notes that the Iraqi state is seemingly foisting the identity of the ruling majority 
Shiite-Arabs (composing 65% of the population), thus marginalizing the identity of 
minorities such as the Kurds who constitute 20% of the population. Further, he argues 
that “Iraq‟s religious diversity and, precisely, the sectarian cleavage between Shiite and 
Sunni Muslims, impose serious challenges to the notion of democracy and democratic 
transition.” Thus, democracy and nation-building are held hostage by “majority rule in a 
way that marginalizes minorities and dissenting voices”. 
 
Finally, Sagnic considers state ideology and minority rights in contemporary Turkey, and 
implications for democracy-building in the country. He argues that Turkey has always 
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stood by the visions of its founding father, Mustapha Kamal Ataturk, in building an 
ethnic state that diminishes and deprives the identity rights of its minority population, 
not least the Kurds living in the Southern part of the country.  Over the years, argues 
Sangic, Turkish state ideology has been elaborately perfected as a tool for persuading and 
assimilating the Kurds and other ethnic and linguistic groups. Reinforcing existing studies 
which emphasize that the Kurds were subjected to a systematic forced assimilation 
campaign by the new Kemalist state, Sagnic stresses that “the formation of Turkey after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is the root to understanding the ideological 
foundation of the Turkish state‟s denial of the Kurds, their history, language and even 
their existence. This has huge implications for Turkey‟s claims to secular democracy, its 
regional stature and aspirations to join the European Union” (emphasis added). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the problems of democracy in Africa and Middle East. The paper 
takes stock of two things. First it explores broadly the discourses on the problems of 
adopting liberal democracy in the two regions. It is argued that liberal democracy has 
inherent requirements that make it difficult to be adopted, without some customisation, 
in less developed countries. Both Africa and Middle East comprise “new states” or 
“post-colonial states” engulfed in certain structural challenges and unique historical and 
cultural anatomies. The paper demonstrates the contradictions of donor double 
standards in advocating democracy in the two regions (foisting it in Africa; tolerating 
non-compliance in the Middle East), as well as how relative development in the Middle 
East has enable some countries to resist foreign pressure for democratisation. An 
interesting question emerges from all this: must countries adopt liberal democracy to 
develop? Middle East countries have no doubt proved that democracy is not a necessary 
condition for development. Secondly, the paper reviews existing work and contributions 
to the present volume of Information, Society and Justice, to identify some problems of 
implementing liberal democracy in the Africa and the Middle East. Regarding Africa, the 
key problems hindering democracy, as discussed in this volume, are elite hegemony, 
contested elections and corruptions (these are by no means exhaustive). As for the 
Middle East, the key problems are state ideology (Turkey), resource, and sectarian 
fragmentation (Iraq). It is worthy to note that the factors are not specific to these 
regions; the factors identified in either region can be found in the other.  
 
 
References 
 
Abdullah, Namo (2010) “Iraq‟s democratic dilemmas: from entrenched dictatorship to 
fragile democracy” Information, Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2:107-115 
 
Ahmed, Raed Asad (2010) “A critical analysis of the role of oil in hindering transition 
towards democracy in the Middle East” Information, Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 95-105. 
 
Ake, Claude (1993) “The Unique Case of African Democracy” International Affairs Vol. 
69, No. 2: 239-244 
 
Bapir, Mohammed Ali (2010) “Iraq: a deeply divided polity & challenges to democracy 
building” Information, Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 107-115. 
93 |                                                       I n f o r m a t i o n ,  S o c i e t y  &  J u s t i c e  
 
 
Barkan, Joel (1994) “Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? 
Lessons from Africa” Paper presented at the Nobel Symposium, Uppsala University, 
Sweden, August. 
 
BBC (2004) “How deep is corruption in Africa” available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3819027.stm, accessed 29th May 2010. 
 
Berger, M. (ed.) (1997) “After the Third World‟ special issue of Third World Quarterly 
25(1). 
 
Bratton, Michael and van de walle, Nicholas (1997) Democratic Experiment in Africa: Regime 
Transitions in Comparative Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chabal, Partick (1998) “A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa” International 
Affairs Vol. 74 No 2: 289-303. 
 
Clapham, Christopher (1985) Third World Politics Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
 
Ekeh, Peter (1995) “The Concept of Second Liberation and the Prospects of Democracy 
in Africa: A Nigerian Context” Paper given at the Conference on Dilemmas of Democracy in 
Nigeria, University of Wisconsin, November 10-12. 
 
Galbraith, Peter W. (2007) The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without 
End New York: Simon & Schuster 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. (199) The Third Wave:  Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Hyden, Goran and Bratton, Michael (1992) (Eds.) Governance and Politics in Africa Boulder, 
Col.: Lynne Rienner.  
 
Joseph, Richard (1997) “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and 
Theoretical Perspectives” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3: 363-382 
 
Mustapha, Mala (2010) “Corruption in Nigeria: conceptual & empirical notes” Information, 
Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 165-175. 
 
Osiki, Omon Merry (2010) “„Gold, Guns & Goons‟: the complexity of electoral 
irregularities in Nigeria, 1999-2007” Information, Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 151-163. 
 
Othman, Karokh Nuraddin (2010) Review of Galbraith, Peter W. The End of Iraq: How 
American Incompetence Created a War Without End, New York: Simon & Schuster, Information, 
Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 195-197. 
 
Ottaway, Marina & Carothers, Thomas (2004) “Middle East Democracy” Foreign Policy 
No. 145: 22-24 & 26-28 
 
Payne, A. (2005) The Global Politics of Unequal Development Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Potter, David (2004) „Democratisation, “good governance” and development‟ in Allen, 
C h a l l e n g e s  o f  d e m o c r a c y  i n  A f r i c a  &  M i d d l e  E a s t         | 94 
 
Tim and Alan Thomas (eds.) Poverty and Development into the 21st Century Milton Kaynes: 
Open University Press (Chapter 17: pp. 365-82). 
 
Ross, Michaell (2001) “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics Vol. 53: 325-361.  
 
Sagnic, Ceng (2010) “Mountain Turks: State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey” 
Information, Society & Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 127-134. 
 
Schmitz, Hans Peter (2004) “Domestic and Transnational Perspectives on 
Democratization” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 3: 403-426 
 
Shin, Doh Chull (1994) “On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and 
Evaluation of the Recent Theory and Research” World Politics Vol. 47:135-170.  
 
Smith, B. C. (2003) Understanding Third World Politics 2nd Edition Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Tar, Usman & Shettima, Abba Gana (2010) “Hegemony and subordination: governing 
class, power politics and contested electoral democracy in Nigeria” Information, Society & 
Justice Vol. 3 No 2: 135-149. 
 
Thomson, Alex (2004) An Introduction to African Politics 2nd Edition, London: Routledge. 
 
Tornquist, Olle (2001) Politics and Development: a Critical Introduction Thousand Oak, Calif.: 
Sage (Chapter 8 & 9:70-85). 
 
Von Hippel, Karin (2000) Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War 
World Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Wiseman, John A. (1996) The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
 
